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ABSTRACT
The world financial crisis that started in 2007 had a profound impact on the
global apparel industry, but at the firm level, the impact of the financial crisis seemed
to be unevenly distributed. Several luxury apparel companies, such as Louis Vuitton,
achieved stable net sales whereas quite a few mass apparel companies, such as GAP,
experienced significant drop of sales and profits. The study intends to systematically
compare the financial performance of luxury apparel companies with mass apparel
companies from 2008 to 2011 to see whether a general pattern of differentiated
performance exists between these two types of companies as a result of their
respective business models and the specific impact of the 2008 financial crisis.
MANOVA test was conducted based on six indices developed under the
Dupont Strategic Profit Model (including annual growth rate of net sales, annual
growth rate of cost of goods sold, gross margin percentage, net profit margin, asset
turnover, and return on assets).

Eight luxury apparel and eight mass apparel

companies were selected for the purpose of the study.
The results showed that first, the overall financial performance between luxury
apparel and mass apparel companies was statistically different from 2008 to 2011.
Second, luxury apparel and mass apparel companies had different gross margin and
asset turnover from 2008 to 2011. Third, there was no evidence showing that luxury
apparel and mass apparel companies achieved different growth of net sales, growth of
cost of goods sold and return on assets (ROA) from 2008 to 2011. Fourth, luxury
apparel companies outperformed mass apparel companies starting in 2010 in terms of
net profit margin, indicating more robust post-crisis recovery.

The results of the study confirmed the differentiated performance of selected
luxury apparel and mass apparel companies’ business models. The findings also
suggested that luxury apparel companies achieved a more robust post-crisis recovery.
Additionally, the results suggested that mass apparel companies should not enter the
luxury apparel market because ROA of luxury apparel companies did not appear to be
better than mass apparel companies.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The economic crisis that started in 2008 had a profound impact on the global
apparel industry (Newbury and Ter Meulen, 2010). As a result of the financial crisis,
consumer spending slowed down, which led to a significant decline in retail sales,
followed by deterioration of financial performance of apparel retailers (Gereffi and
Frederick, 2010; Newbury and ter Meulen, 2010). At the firm level, however, impacts
of the financial crisis seemed to be unevenly distributed. For example, net sales of
some luxury apparel companies such as Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy (LVMH)
seemed to remain stable since the financial crisis in 2008. In comparison, mass
apparel companies such as Gap and Limited Brands experienced a significant drop in
both net sales and net profits (Barrie, 2009; Hoover’s, 2012a, 2012b; Tungate, 2009).
It remains a question whether the apparent different financial performance among
several companies is just a random phenomenon or reflects a more general pattern
between the luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies since the 2008
financial crisis.
This study intends to explore whether luxury apparel companies performed
better than mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011 as a result of the financial
crisis. Results of this study will contribute to the understanding of the sectoral impact
of the 2008 financial crisis on the apparel market, which has seldom been discussed.
It will also illustrate the business models of the luxury apparel companies and mass
apparel companies and suggest the best business model for apparel companies in the
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post financial crisis era.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter provides the literature review that leads to the conceptual model
for the study. The first section provides definitions and theories. Next the differences
between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies and their different business
models are suggested. Lastly, their respective impacts from the financial crisis are
highlighted.

2.1 Definitions
In this study, a luxury apparel company refers to a company whose business
focuses on high quality luxury apparel targeting the wealthy and sold at high price
points in order to remain exclusive (Okonkwo, 2007). A mass apparel company refers
to a company that is known for carrying multiple apparel categories and targets a wide
audience in the middle-market, selling non-exclusive products (Okonkwo, 2007).
Researchers have suggested different definitions of luxury, but most agree that
it can be defined based on three aspects: 1) social/psychological benefits, 2) price
point, 3) and product nature (Husic and Cicic, 2009; Vigneron and Johnson, 2004;
Kapferer and Bastien 2009a; Kuang-peng, Chen, Peng, Hackley, Rungpaka et al.,
2011).
First, in terms of social/psychological benefits, the ownership and use of
luxury products allow consumers to feel good about themselves and they are able to
communicate nonverbally about themselves to their peers and the outside world
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(Vigneron and Johnson, 2004). Husic and Cicic (2009) suggested that luxury goods
bring a sense of esteem to the owner through the display or use of a certain brand
deemed as luxury and this esteem is separate from any functional value. Consumers
have a sense of pride and power when they carry a Gucci purse or wear Prada shoes
and they want to impress others by showing they are able to afford such products
(Atwal and Williams, 2009). Therefore, these consumers are concerned with how
others perceive them. Vigneron and Johnson (2004) suggested that consumers can
fulfill psychological and functional needs through luxury goods and the benefits
obtained through the psychological fulfillments are the distinguishing factors between
luxury and non-luxury goods. Consumers who buy luxury goods do so because they
can, not because those products are the only products that fulfill that function. Some
people are satisfied with an inexpensive, no-name handbag because it provides the
function of carrying what they need for the day whereas luxury consumers prefer to
carry a luxury designer bag because it shows their ability to purchase luxury brands
and serves the function of carrying their daily necessities away from home.
The social/psychological benefits of purchasing the luxury goods can also be
explained from the perspective of behavior economics. For example, Thorstein Veblen
named this ostentatious display of one’s status and wealth through fashion as
conspicuous consumption in The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) (Kaiser, 2012).
The study argued that people spent extravagantly on goods visible to others to show
that they were financially and socially successful (Veblen, 1899). Veblen’s theory of
conspicuous consumption correlates with the signaling theory, meaning that the
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conspicuous consumption is a form of signaling in which the characteristic being
signaled is wealth (Bird and Smith, 2005). Signaling in this way, as suggested by
Veblen, enhanced social status when one’s status was not widely known (Bird and
Smith, 2005). This signaling of wealth helped describe a clear difference between
those with established wealth who did not need to take part in conspicuous
consumption and those with new wealth who needed to show it off (Bird and Smith,
2005).
Second, in terms of price point, luxury products incorporate premium pricing,
which means they are typically expensive and not financially accessible to the masses
(Okonkwo, 2007; Newbury and ter Meulen, 2010). Prices of luxury products are
significantly higher than prices of products that are non-luxury with similar features
(Vigneron and Johnson, 2004). Keller (2009) suggested that these high prices are
validated by the established image of prestige that is held by luxury products.
Third, luxury is further known to mean high quality. Consumers expect to
receive a quality product when making a luxury purchase to justify the high price tag
(Brun et al., 2008). Luxury objects are typically durable and can increase in value
over time, such as a Louis Vuitton suitcase (Kapferer and Bastien 2009a; Pendle and
Stiles, 2009). The high quality of luxury goods is seen in the quality of the materials
used and the high level of precision and craftsmanship employed to manufacture the
goods (Okonkwo, 2007).
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2.2 Business Models of Luxury Apparel and Mass Apparel Companies
Business models capture the core of how a business will be focused and how it
will operate (Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005). The components of business
models include how the business creates value (product mix, distribution), the target
market, internal capability factors (production, selling/marketing, packaging, supply
chain management), competitive strategy factors (service/product quality, customer
relationships), economic factors (pricing sources, margins, volumes), and investor
factors (growth strategies, income models) (Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005).
Because of the unique characteristics of luxury goods, luxury apparel
companies adopt business models that are different from mass apparel companies.
These differences are seen in their target markets, pricing strategies,
marketing/branding strategies, and different degrees of internationalization.
First, the target markets of luxury apparel companies and mass apparel
companies are different. Luxury apparel companies target the wealthy members of
society and those signaling wealth who are willing to spend large amounts of money
on consumer goods (Keller, 2009). It should be noted that the target market for luxury
is changing; the rising number of millionaires worldwide has created a new, youthful,
group of global luxury consumers (Okonkwo, 2007). China is now the world’s largest
luxury goods market, Japan makes up a quarter of the world’s luxury goods
consumption, India’s luxury goods market is growing rapidly, and the luxury goods
market in Moscow, Russia is worth more than the market in New York (Okonkwo,
2007). In comparison, middle-class consumers are the main target market for mass
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apparel companies (Newbury and ter Meulen, 2010; Lasserre, 2007). These
consumers are price sensitive and place a high emphasis on value, but not necessarily
bargain hunting (Okonkwo, 2007; Driscoll, 2011).
Second, the pricing strategy for luxury apparel companies is much different
than that of the mass apparel companies. Luxury apparel companies focus on a
premium pricing strategy with minimal discounts and markdowns because too many
discounts could tarnish their premium image (Keller, 2009). They even are known to
occasionally raise their prices in order to make their products more exclusive and
increase demand (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009b). Luxury goods are typically more
expensive in China due to local taxes that inflate the prices and because of this, many
Chinese consumers travel to Europe to purchase their luxury products (Sanderson,
2013). In response to this rise of Chinese tourists and to increase exclusivity of their
products in Europe, some luxury companies are raising their prices in Europe,
including Prada, Louis Vuitton, and Salvatore Ferragamo, an Italian luxury goods
company (Sanderson, 2013; CPP Luxury, 2013). Mass apparel companies, on the
other hand, use markdowns to increase sales and to sell off poorly selling or unsold
products (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009a). Often, mass apparel companies need to offer
discounts to keep their customers and remain competitive (Great American Group,
2011). Due to their cost cutting strategy, mass apparel companies are prone to price
competition (Fratto, Jones, and Cassill, 2006). Luxury companies focus on high price
and low volume, whereas mass apparel companies focus on low price, high volume.
Although luxury apparel companies can be small in revenue as compared to mass
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apparel companies, they are respected globally with distinguishing reputations
(Chevalier and Mazzalovo, 2012).
Third, branding and marketing strategies are different for luxury apparel and
mass apparel companies. Branding is crucial to the success of apparel companies, but
particularly to luxury apparel companies who must uphold their premium images;
weak branding strategies can tarnish their image (Okonkwo, 2007). Luxury apparel
companies typically have a high level of global brand awareness and an aspirational
quality and emotional appeal that set them apart from the crowded mass fashion
market (Okonkwo, 2007). It is important for luxury apparel marketing to convey an
image of quality and authenticity while also selling an experience and aspirational
lifestyle (Atwal and Williams, 2009). Many luxury apparel print advertisements try to
evoke sensuality and communicate with their audience that they can feel good about
themselves and powerful through the use of luxury goods. On the other hand, mass
apparel companies focus more on communicating their low prices and good value,
rather than an aspirational lifestyle. Oftentimes, their ads specify low prices and deals
whereas luxury apparel advertising does not mention prices (Kapferer and Bastien,
2009a). As companies that focus on price to differentiate themselves in the market,
mass apparel companies have intense advertising campaigns that incorporate their
price advantage and use their competitive prices as their branding strategy (Fratto,
Jones, and Cassill, 2006).
Lastly, luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies have different
degrees of internationalization. Luxury apparel companies are oftentimes well-known
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by consumers around the world (Okonkwo, 2007). They have been focusing on
entering emerging markets where consumer awareness and demand for their products
are rapidly increasing (Asaeda, 2012). For example, many luxury apparel companies
have grasped the financial benefits from getting access to the lucrative and fast
growing Asia and Latin America markets (Adendorff, 2012). Much to the contrary,
internationalization efforts of mass apparel companies have been less prevalent,
especially in emerging markets (Driscoll, 2011; Asaeda, 2012). International
consumers, particularly those in emerging markets such as China, often favor luxury
apparel brands over mass apparel brands because the consumption of luxury apparel
allows them to display their wealth and social status, which is important to them (Gao,
Norton, Zhang, and To, 2009). Postrel (2008) also suggested that consumers with
rising incomes in emerging markets such as China and Russia are so drawn to luxury
products because “rich people in poor places want to show off their wealth.”
European luxury apparel companies have had the biggest success in China as fashions
from these countries are received positively for their style, quality, and high fashion
appeal, whereas apparel companies from the U.S., particularly mass apparel
companies, are seen more as casual rather than high fashion, thus they have lower
penetration in China (Dickson, Lennon, Montalto, Shen and Zhang, 2004). Entering
international markets requires knowledge in selecting appropriate sites and
merchandise assortments, as well as the ability to adopt to the local market (Driscoll,
2011). Due to these reasons, mass apparel companies have not placed as high an
emphasis on entering international markets as have the luxury apparel companies.
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2.3 Impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the Apparel Industry
The 2008 financial crisis had a significant impact across all industries, but
particularly had a significant impact on the apparel retail industry (Staritz, 2011). The
immediate cause of the financial crisis was the subprime lending by banks and the
burst of the housing bubble (Friedman, 2011). Bankers who used borrowed money to
buy risky subprime securities also caused and accelerated the crisis (Friedman, 2011;
Bragues, 2010). The U.S. was heavily affected by this financial crisis; unemployment
in this country increased, and reached a peak of 10.1% in October 2009 (Driscoll,
2011). This caused the apparel industry to suffer by leading to diminished consumer
spending and a decline in international trade. As retailers experienced reduced sales,
global suppliers were negatively affected due to reduced demand. Apparel imports to
the U.S. decreased by 3.3% in 2008 and 12% in 2009 (Staritz, 2011). Apparel imports
to the European Union were also negatively affected and decreased by 5.2% in 2009
(Staritz, 2011). Apparel retailers in the U.S. in particular experienced decreased
revenues, slow inventory turnover, and tight cash flows (Staritz, 2011). In 2008, U.S.
department store sales declined 13.3% and specialty apparel retailer sales declined
10.4% from November 2007-November 2008 (Rosenbloom, 2008). U.S. apparel
companies experienced from 3% to 15% decline in sales in 2009 (Driscoll, 2011).
In addition to the general decline, there was also a widening income gap, a
change in consumer behavior and purchase intention, and dual speed recovery in
developed and emerging economies. Luxury apparel and mass apparel companies
were affected differently from these suggested impacts of the financial crisis.

	
  

10	
  

First, the financial crisis strengthened the widening income gap (Lowrey,
2012). From 2007 to 2009, those with the top incomes experienced a drastic 15.6%
decline, but from 2009 to 2011, the annual wages of the top 1% grew 8.2% (Mishel
and Finio, 2013). The annual wages of the bottom 90% have continued to decrease
since the financial crisis (Mishel and Finio, 2013). From 2007 to 2009, the income
gap became less apparent, but then widened again from 2009 to 2011 during the
recovery (Mishel and Finio, 2013). The income gap between the richest 20% in the
U.S. and the rest of the country is growing (Tavernise, 2012). A cause of the
widening income gap is consumers in the middle class have suffered more than the
luxury consumers throughout the post-financial crisis recovery (Driscoll, 2011). The
luxury consumers have bounced back from the recession and are even getting richer,
whereas the middle class is declining, thus shrinking the customer base for mass
apparel companies (Tavernise, 2012). Despite the slow economic growth in
developed countries, the luxury apparel market is growing and is expected to continue
to grow as consumers in emerging markets, particularly China and Brazil, experience
rising incomes and growing desire for luxury goods (PR Newswire, 2012).
Second, the economic crisis caused a change in consumer behavior and
purchase intention. Consumers have become more sophisticated and retailers have
needed to change strategies in order to please these more discerning customers who
want lower prices and better value; since the recession, customers have realized that
they can survive off less, thus it is crucial for companies to market themselves as
having the best value to please their target market (Apparel Online, 2011). Across all
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sectors of the industry, consumers have become more restrained in their spending and
the industry is experiencing a “new normal” (Driscoll, 2011). Luxury apparel
customers, however, are not as affected by price as middle-income customers, who
were more negatively affected by the financial crisis (Driscoll, 2011). The mass
apparel retailers which target the middle market consumers have been at risk as
consumers have been shopping for either discount goods or luxury goods (Asaeda,
2012). Although luxury apparel consumers still purchased during the recession, they
did not purchase multiple items, but very selectively bought single items (Reyneke,
2010). Luxury consumers cut back, but did not completely disappear during the
financial crisis.
Third, dual speed recovery refers to the phenomenon that some emerging
market economies are recovering more quickly than developed economies that are still
struggling, with some even declining (Pardede, 2011). In 2010, developing countries
grew 7.3%, whereas high-income countries grew only 3% (Canuto, 2012). Emerging
markets are becoming wealthier and spending their money on luxury products.
Chevalier and Mazzalovo (2012) suggested that the substantial growth of the luxury
fashion business in the developing countries of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China) is due to their increasing number of wealthy citizens and the rising awareness
and availability of luxury brands. Chinese tourists in particular are driving the
demand for luxury goods as their economy increases (Driscoll, 2011). In 2011,
Chinese consumption of luxury goods accounted for over 20% of the global luxury
market (Asaeda, 2012). Luxury apparel companies looking to expand their business
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are entering emerging markets and tapping into the growing wealth of consumers in
these countries. These impacts of the financial crisis helped lead to different financial
performances between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Conceptual Model and Hypothesis
Luxury apparel and mass apparel companies have different business models in
terms of their target markets, pricing strategies, marketing/branding strategies, and
degrees of internationalization. Effects of the financial crisis, which seemed to favor
luxury apparel companies, include the widening income gap, change in consumer
behavior and purchase intention, and dual speed recovery in developed and emerging
economies. Based on these aspects, as proposed in Figure 1, this study hypothesizes
that luxury apparel companies performed better than mass apparel companies in the
2008 financial crisis.

	
  

14	
  

Figure 1.
Proposed Conceptual Model

Different business models between luxury apparel
and mass apparel companies
• Target market
• Pricing strategy
• Marketing and branding strategy
• Degree of internationalization

Hypothesis:
It is hypothesized that luxury apparel and mass apparel
companies performed differently in the 2008 financial crisis
because of their different business models and specific effects
of the crisis.

Effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the apparel
retail industry
• Widening income gap
• Consumer behavior and purchase intention
• Dual speed recoveries
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3.2 Company Selection
Despite numerous research studies on luxury companies, there is no official list
of luxury apparel companies that could be used directly by this study. To create such
a list, as the first step, names of luxury companies were collected from three sources:
World Luxury Association (2012), Interbrand (2008), and Okonkwo (2007). World
Luxury Association is the world’s largest non-profit organization of research and
management for luxury brands; Interbrand has been widely cited in related studies that
measure brand value (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009b; James, 2011); and Okonkwo
(2007) is a comprehensive study of the luxury fashion industry. As shown in Table 1,
22 companies were included in this preliminary list, which covered most of the wellknown luxury brands in the world.
Because this study focused on luxury apparel companies only while the
preliminary compiled list also included companies in other sectors, such as jewelry
and automobiles, the second step was to filter the list of companies. This was done
based on whether the company fell under the apparel category in the Hoover’s
database. Due to availability of data, the list was also limited to only publicly traded
companies. The Hoover’s database was used to access the financial information for
the companies because it is considered “the world’s leading source of commercial
information and insight on businesses” (Dun & Bradstreet, 2012).
In order to make the sample more representative, the competitors of each
luxury company were added to the list so long as they also fell under the apparel
category and were publicly traded. Altogether, three companies were added: Michael
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Kors (competitor of Burberry, Gucci, LVMH, and Prada), Hugo Boss (competitor of
Gucci, LVMH, and Prada), and Mulberry (competitor of Burberry, Gucci, Hermès,
LVMH, and Prada). Since these three companies were considered competitors of the
top luxury apparel companies, their inclusion in the list for this research was justified.
The list of luxury companies was adjusted due to lack of available data.
Michael Kors was removed from the luxury company list because its complete
financial data from 2008 to 2011 was not available on the Hoover’s database since its
IPO was in 2011; the only information available was its 2010−2011 revenue. The
only annual report available on the company’s website was for 2012. Prada’s net sales
and cost of goods sold for 2007 were not available on Hoover’s or the Prada financials
website. Net sales for 2007 were found in Plunkett’s Retail Industry Almanac (2009),
a detailed and comprehensive study on retail trade. All other financial figures for
Prada were acquired from the company’s financial reports. The 2007 numbers for
Christian Dior were not available from Hoover’s but were found through the
company’s own financial reports available on its website. The final list of luxury
apparel companies for the purpose of this research, as shown in Table 1, included
eight companies: PPR (parent company of Gucci, which has changed its name to
Kering), LVMH (Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy), Hermès, Prada, Burberry, Christian
Dior, Hugo Boss, and Mulberry.
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Table 1.
Luxury Apparel Company Selection

Company

Apparel Company

Hermès
Chanel
LVMH
Gucci
Christian Dior
Ferragamo

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Available Financial
Data
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Chosen for Final List

Versace
Prada
Fendi

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No. Part of LVMH

Giorgio Armani
Ermenegildo Zegna

Yes
Yes

No
No

No
No

Rolex
Tiffany & Co
Cartier
Ferrari
Bulgari
Burberry
Patek Philippe
Michael Kors

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Hugo Boss
Mulberry

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No. Categorized by
Hoover's database as
shoe company

Data source: World Luxury Association (2012), Interbrand (2008), Okonkwo (2007),
and Hoover’s (2012)
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To show the growing sales of luxury apparel companies in emerging markets,
particularly Asia, compared to the EU and the Americas, annual reports for each
company selected were accessed. In Table 2, revenues for 2008 and 2011 were
reported, as this was the starting year and ending year for the study respectively.
Since PPR and LVMH are large conglomerates, it should be noted that the PPR
numbers reported for this table represent the company’s Luxury Division and the
LVMH numbers represent its Fashion and Leather Goods Division; for each company,
these are their largest divisions (PPR, 2012; LVMH, 2012). The numbers for the other
companies represent them as a whole. Prada did not have available its 2008 annual
report; instead, the 2009 numbers were reported. Mulberry did not specify emerging
markets in its 2008 annual report, but noted the other region as “rest of world.” From
this table, it is apparent that each luxury apparel company selected has increased its
share in emerging markets, with emphasis on expansion in Asia.
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Table 2.
Luxury Apparel Company Revenue by Region, 2008 and 2011
2008
Emerging
Markets (Asia)
23%

EU &
Americas
50%

2011
Emerging
Markets (Asia)
32%

Company
PPR

EU &
Americas
59%

LVMH

48%

25%

46%

32%

Hermès

57%

18%

53%

28%

Prada

61%

26%

55%

35%

Burberry

75%

21%

59%

33%

Christian Dior

61%

20%

55%

27%

Hugo Boss

88%

12%

83%

15%

Mulberry

92%

8%

86%

13%

Data source: PPR (2009), PPR (2012), LVMH (2009), LVMH (2012), Hermès (2009),
Hermès (2012), Prada (2010), Prada (2012), Burberry (2009), Burberry (2012),
Christian Dior (2009), Christian Dior (2012), Hugo Boss (2009), Hugo Boss (2012),
Mulberry (2009), Mulberry (2012)
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Similar to the case for the luxury apparel companies, no direct list of mass
apparel companies is available to use for the purpose of this study. To create such a
list, Speer (2012) was first consulted. Prepared by Apparel Magazine, Speer (2012)
included 50 publicly traded apparel companies with at least $100 million in annual
global sales. Because of the large sales revenue, companies on the list represented the
most influential mass apparel companies in the market. However, Speer (2012)
included mass apparel companies with a wide variety of retail formats, target markets,
and branding strategies, some of which were very different from luxury apparel
companies. To make the comparison meaningful, this study only selected those mass
apparel companies that carry multiple apparel categories (as opposed to a category
killer) and those that target a wide target market (as opposed to a narrow market, i.e.
teenagers). Additionally, some companies (such as Body Central and Express) were
excluded from the study because of the unavailability of their complete financial data
from 2008 to 2011. Eventually, eight mass apparel companies which met all the
requirements were chosen: Limited Brands, Ralph Lauren, Urban Outfitters, Chico’s,
GAP, Ann Inc., Guess, and Perry Ellis. These are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3.
Mass Apparel Company Selection

	
  

Company

Apparel
Company

Zuoan

Yes

lululemon athletica

Retail
Format
Compatible
to Luxury
Companies

Available
Financial
Data

Chosen for Final List

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

The Buckle

Yes

No

Yes

Francesca’s
Collections
Casual Male Retail
Group

Yes

No

No

No (different retail
format)
No (narrow product
category)
No (different retail
format)
No

Yes

No

Yes

No (narrow product
category)

True Religion
Jeans

Yes

No

Yes

No (narrow product
category)

Nike

Yes

No

Yes

Jos. A Bank
Clothiers
Ralph Lauren
Guess?
VF Corp.

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Limited Brands
Urban Outfitters
The Cato Corp.

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Express
UniFirst
Zumiez

Yes
No
Yes

Yes
No
No

No
Yes
Yes

Body Central
Under Armour

Yes
Yes

No
No

No
Yes

Nordstrom

Yes

No

Yes

Cintas Corp.

No

No

Yes

Chico’s FAS
Columbia

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

No (narrow product
category)
No (narrow product
category)
Yes
Yes
No (different retail
format)
Yes
Yes
No (different retail
format)
No
No
No (different retail
format)
No
No (narrow product
category)
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
Yes
No (narrow product
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Sportswear
Ascena Retail
Group
HanesBrands

	
  

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Gap
Maidenform
Brands
Carter’s

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes

No

Yes

PVH Corp.

Yes

No

Yes

rue21

Yes

No

Yes

The Warnaco
Group
The Men’s
Wearhouse
American Eagle
Outfitters
The Children’s
Place
Ever-Glory
International
Destination
Maternity
G-III Apparel
Group
G&K Services
Ann Inc.
Oxford Industries

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Superior Uniform
Group
Delta Apparel

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Abercrombie &
Fitch Co.
Aeropostale

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Levi Strauss & Co.

Yes

No

Yes

Perry Ellis
Wet Seal

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Stage Stores

Yes

No

Yes

Stein Mart

Yes

No

Yes

Wacoal

Yes

No

Yes
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category)
No (different retail
format)
No (narrow product
category)
Yes
No (narrow product
category)
No (narrow product
category)
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
No (narrow product
category)
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
No (narrow product
category)
No (different retail
format)
No
Yes
No (different retail
format)
No (narrow product
category)
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
No (narrow product
category)
Yes
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
No (different retail
format)
No (narrow product
category)

Annual reports of the mass apparel companies selected from 2008 and 2011
were accessed to report the revenue distribution by region, specifically that of the EU
and the Americas compared to emerging markets, particularly Asia. Based on the
numbers in Table 4, it is suggested that the mass apparel companies have not been
emphasizing expansion in the emerging markets compared to the luxury apparel
retailers. In 2011, only three mass apparel companies studied reported revenue in
emerging markets, whereas all the luxury apparel companies reported sales in these
regions. It should be noted that Perry Ellis did not provide a breakdown of revenue by
region for either year.
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Table 4.
Mass Apparel Company Revenue by Region, 2008 and 2011
2008
Emerging
Markets (Asia)
N/A

EU &
Americas
100%

2011
Emerging
Markets (Asia)
N/A

Company
Limited Brands

EU &
Americas
100%

Ralph Lauren

92%

N/A

86%

14%

Urban Outfitters

100%

N/A

100%

N/A

Chico’s

100%

N/A

100%

N/A

Gap

86%

7%

80%

8%

Ann Inc.

100%

N/A

100%

N/A

Guess

83%

6%

87%

8%

Perry Ellis

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Data Source: Limited Brands (2009), Limited Brands (2012), Ralph Lauren (2009),
Ralph Lauren (2012), Urban Outfitters (2009), Urban Outfitters (2012), Chico’s
(2009), Chico’s (2012), Gap (2009), Gap (2012), Ann Inc. (2009), Ann Inc. (2012),
Guess (2009), Guess (2012), Perry Ellis (2009), Perry Ellis (2012)
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3.3 Measurement of Company Performance
This study adopted the Dupont Strategic Profit Model (DSPM) to measure the
performance of luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies. Developed by
the Dupont Corporation, DSPM is one of the most popular tools used in the business
world to systematically and comprehensively analyze the financial performance of a
company (Stapleton, Hanna, Yagla, Johnson, & Markussen, 2002). DSPM served the
purpose of this study by analyzing the financial performances of the two categories of
companies, specifically their profitability and productivity. The model depicts how
return on assets is a function of net profit and asset turnover, which measure
profitability and productivity respectively (Stapleton et al., 2002). Stapleton et al.
(2002) used this strategic profit model to analyze six athletic footwear companies and
how changes to sales, cost of goods sold, variable expenses, inventories, and accounts
receivable affected the return on net worth for each company. The strategic profit
model was applied to each company to pinpoint their individual strengths and
weaknesses.
Based on DSPM, six indices were selected to analyze the performance of
companies in this study:
•

Growth of net sales. Net sales refer to the total sales revenue after deductions

for customer returns and allowances have been made (Easterling, Flottman, Jernigan,
& Wuest, 2008). However, net sales are also affected by the size of the companies,
which may cause biasness in the results, given the various sizes of luxury apparel and
mass apparel companies selected in Table 1 and Table 2. Growth rate of net sales was
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used to eliminate the impact of firm size on the result. Growth of net sales was
calculated by subtracting this year’s sales by last year’s sales and dividing by last
year’s sales. The value of the growth of net sales reflects the healthiness of companies
in receiving sales revenue. A positive growth rate indicates an improvement in
performance in achieving sales revenue. A negative growth rate signifies a decline in
performance of net sales from the previous year.
•

Growth of cost of goods sold. Cost of goods sold measures the cost of the

inventory sold during a period and is influenced by the billed cost of merchandise,
cash discounts, transportation, and workroom costs (i.e. labor) (Ingram and Albright,
2007; Easterling et al., 2008). The percent change of cost of goods sold was used to
evaluate whether their costs increased or decreased each year. Because the growth of
cost of goods sold was affected by both the unit price of purchasing and the volume of
product sold, interpretation of the result shall combine with the growth of net sales.
•

Gross margin is represented by the difference between net sales and cost of

goods sold (Easterling et al., 2008). Gross margin percent was reported in this study
as it showed the gross profit rate, again reducing the biasness that may result from the
various sizes of the selected companies. It was calculated by dividing gross margin by
net sales. Companies aim for a higher gross margin percent as it represents the more
money they retain per dollar of sales to cover other costs (Steinmetz & Brooks, 2006).
An increase in gross margin indicates an improvement in performance, whereas a
decrease in gross margin indicates a reduction in performance.
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•

Net profit was determined by subtracting operating expenses, net interests, and

taxes from gross margin (Bisetty, Fourie, Günther, Richards, & Smith, 2009). Net
profit is the final profit achieved by sales and is referred to as “the bottom line” (Berry
& Jarvis, 2006). A higher net profit percent indicated a company was performing
financially well; a lower net profit percent indicated a company needed help
financially and could be losing too much of their revenue to expenses.
•

Asset turnover “indicates how efficiently a company uses its assets to generate

sales” (Kimmel, Weygandt, & Kieso, 2011). To calculate this ratio, total assets were
divided by net sales. A higher asset turnover indicates a company is selling their
products quickly to generate sales, and merchandise is not sitting around for long
periods of time. Thus, a higher asset turnover indicates strong financial performance,
whereas a lower ratio indicates weak financial performance.
•

Return on assets (ROA) results from the interaction of net profit and asset

turnover and helps determine a company’s financial performance in terms of how
assets generate sales (Stickney, Weil, Schipper, & Francis, 2010). It relates the
profitability of a company to the value of the assets used (Stapleton et al., 2002). This
means it indicates how profitable a company is related to its total assets. As ROA
increases, a company’s financial performance increases as well, and as ROA
decreases, financial performance decreases.
Although researchers have reported that signs of the financial crisis started in
2007, the effects of the crisis were being felt throughout the entire economy by 2008,
the starting year for the study (Taylor, 2009). The analysis continued through 2011 to
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study how the companies performed during and after the financial crisis; this was also
the last year the latest data was available. Each company and index was studied
annually to determine the growth rate for each year and to take each index into
consideration. The average levels from 2008 to 2011 were calculated by averaging
each index throughout the four years. For example, the average of net profit was
calculated by adding net profit of each individual company from 2008 to 2011, then
dividing by four, the number of years studied. This method calculated the overall
average for each index from 2008 to 2011 and was done to determine how each
company performed overall per index. By looking at the annual performance and
average performance, patterns over the years could be identified.

3.4 Method of Analysis
This study adopted multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to evaluate
the hypothesis, specifically whether the financial performance of luxury apparel and
mass apparel companies differed from 2008 to 2011. As shown in Equation 1,
MANOVA test compared the mean values of the multiple financial indices to
determine whether there were statistically significant differences between the two
groups (Huberty and Olejnik, 2006). In this study, MANOVA revealed whether
financial performance measured by six indices (namely growth rate of net sales,
growth rate of cost of goods sold, gross margin, net profit, asset turnover and ROA)
were significantly different in mean value between luxury apparel companies and
mass apparel companies.
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𝑦!"# = 𝜇!" + 𝜀!"#

(1)

Specifically in Equation 1:
Dependent variable 𝑦!"# denoted the value of the rth variable (i.e. the six
indices that measured the firm performance, namely growth rate of net sales, growth
rate of cost of goods sold, gross margin, net profit, asset turnover, and ROA) for
observation j (i.e. individual company) in group i (i.e. luxury or mass apparel company
group). Independent variable 𝜇!" denoted the value of group i for the rth variable; this
represented the two categories of companies for comparison in this study: luxury
apparel companies and mass apparel companies. The last variable denoted the
residual of the rth variable for observation j in group i.
The null hypothesis for MANOVA proposed there was no significant
difference in financial performance, i.e. H0: 𝑢! =    𝜇! =    𝜇! = ⋯  𝜇!. The alternative
hypothesis suggested that luxury apparel and mass apparel companies did perform
differently, meaning that not all dependent variable values were the same across
companies and years, i.e, H1: at least two 𝑢! are unequal. To determine whether to
accept the null hypothesis or the alternative hypothesis, the answer was based on the
p-value of Wilks’ Lambda, Pillai’s Trace, Hotteling-Lawley Trace, and Roy’s Greatest
Root. If the p-value was statistically significant, the null hypothesis was rejected; if
the p-value was not significant, the null hypothesis was not rejected. In this study, a pvalue of less than 0.05 was determined significant.
If MANOVA result suggested that financial performance of luxury apparel
companies and mass apparel companies overall was statistically different, between-
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subject test was further conducted to determine which one(s) of the six indices that
measure the financial performance of firms led to the statistical significance of
MANOVA (Lu, 2012).
MANOVA and between-subject test were conducted from 2008 to 2011 both
annually and on average to evaluate financial performance from the beginning of the
economic crisis up to the year in which the most recent data was available and to
evaluate the overall performance throughout the years. MANOVA was conducted
using the SAS statistical software package.
Annual reports for each company were accessed to provide explanations of the
strategies used by the individual companies in terms of merchandise mix, domestic
and international growth as well as detailed information regarding their financial
performance. This information helped provide insight into the strengths and
weaknesses for each company.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

4.1 Descriptive Analysis
The average performance of luxury apparel and mass apparel companies from
2008 to 2011 are shown in Table 5, and described as follows. Figures 2 through 7
represent each financial index over the time period studied.
First, neither the luxury apparel companies nor the mass apparel companies
showed a clear pattern of net sales growth over the examined period. According to
Table 5, although net sales of luxury apparel companies suffered a sharper decline
than the mass apparel companies in 2008, luxury apparel companies enjoyed faster
rebound in 2010. Net sales of luxury apparel companies decreased 3.43% in 2008
whereas net sales of mass apparel companies increased 1.13%. During 2009, luxury
apparel net sales increased almost 2% whereas mass apparel net sales decreased 2.5%.
In 2010, luxury apparel net sales increased 21.88% and mass apparel net sales
increased 10.75%. Both luxury apparel and mass apparel companies experienced
increases in net sales in 2011, 16% and 12% respectively.
The net sales fluctuation was even more significant at the firm level. For
example, net sales of Mulberry and Burberry, two luxury companies, decreased 18%
and 14% respectively in 2008, but increased 80% and 35% in 2010 respectively. In
2008, Mulberry used retained profits and cash flow to invest in the opening of new
shops and increased its marketing expenditures (Mulberry, 2009). Net sales increased
significantly for Mulberry in 2010 due to their increased investment in Asia and
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Europe. The company opened new stores in Athens, Korea, Singapore, and the
Helsinki airport (Mulberry 2011). Burberry, in 2008, experienced decline in their
wholesale revenue in Spain and certain licenses, mostly in menswear, were not
renewed which significantly reduced revenue (Burberry, 2009). In 2010, increased
market share in the US, the Middle East, and Asia helped Burberry improve net sales
that year (Burberry, 2011). In 2008, Urban Outfitters and Guess, two mass apparel
companies, increased 22% and 20% in net sales respectively. Urban Outfitters
attributed its growth to new store net sales and direct-to-consumer net sales; the
company opened 49 new stores that year (Urban Outfitters, 2009). In 2008, Guess
reported that its European and licensing businesses helped accelerate its revenue
growth; the company also opened 20 free-standing stores in China that year (Guess,
2009). At the opposite end, Limited Brands, a mass apparel company experienced an
11% decrease in net sales in 2008 due to reduced consumer spending caused by the
financial crisis (Limited Brands, 2009). Ann Inc. reported an almost 17% decline in
net sales in 2009 due to a product assortment that did not appeal to their customers and
high costs associated with the company’s strategic restructuring (Ann Inc., 2009). The
following years saw growth again for both luxury apparel and mass apparel
companies.
Second, growth of cost of goods sold did not show a clear pattern for either the
luxury apparel companies or mass apparel companies. It was lower for luxury apparel
companies in 2008, 2011, and the average of the four years. In 2009, it was negative
for both luxury apparel and mass apparel companies, meaning that it decreased for
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both from 2008. Growth rate of cost of goods sold increased for both in 2010; 10.13%
for luxury apparel and 9.38% for mass apparel companies. This increase was
attributable to the rise in net sales. In 2011, it was higher for mass apparel companies,
15.38%, whereas it was 9.50% for luxury apparel companies.
Third, gross margin of luxury apparel and mass apparel companies was
noticeably different, specifically luxury apparel companies achieved a higher gross
margin on average due to their higher markups. It increased every year for luxury
apparel but for mass apparel companies, it increased from 2008 to 2010, and then
slightly decreased in 2011. At the company level, Urban Outfitters reported a 6%
drop in gross profit from 2010 to 2011 and attributed this decrease to an increase in
markdowns to clear inventory that was moving slowly (Urban Outfitters, 2012). Gap
reported a 4% decrease in gross profit from 2010 to 2011 but did not disclose a reason
why in their 2011 annual report. A big difference in gross margin was evident in 2011
when the highest gross margin for a luxury apparel company was 72% (Prada), and the
highest gross margin for a mass apparel company was 58% (Ralph Lauren). The
average gross margin was 61.88% for luxury apparel and 44.50% for mass apparel
companies.
Fourth, luxury apparel companies also achieved higher net profit margin than
the mass apparel companies during the examined period. It increased every year for
luxury apparel companies, whereas for mass apparel companies, it increased from
2008 to 2010, and then slightly decreased in 2011. Urban Outfitters experienced a 5%
decrease in net profit from 2010 to 2011 due to increases in expenses and taxes (Urban
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Outfitters, 2012). In 2008, net profit for mass apparel companies was significantly
lower than luxury apparel companies, 2.5% compared to 8%. A contributing factor to
this was that Ann Inc., a mass apparel company, reported a -15% net profit that year
due to costs associated with the launch of a new strategic restructuring program (Ann
Inc., 2009). This company’s average net profit for all four years was -2%, as it still
experienced costs from the restructuring program. The average net profit percentages
were 11.13% and 6% for luxury apparel and mass apparel respectively.
Fifth, asset turnover was higher for mass apparel companies for each year and
the average of the years. Asset turnover for each mass apparel company was over 1.00
whereas only three luxury apparel companies had asset turnover over 1.00. These
companies were Burberry, which implemented a new strategic plan in 2008 focused
on entering under-penetrated markets and accelerating their retail growth, Hugo Boss,
and Mulberry (Burberry, 2009). Mulberry had a high asset turnover due to the
company’s strong expansion throughout Europe and Asia where in 2010, demand
exceeded supply (Mulberry, 2010). Another pattern that was apparent was it
decreased each year from 2008 to 2010 for both luxury apparel and mass apparel, but
then increased for both in 2011, due to post-crisis recovery. The average asset
turnover for luxury apparel companies was 0.92, whereas for mass apparel companies,
it was 1.65.
Lastly, overall, there did not appear to be noticeable patterns in the mean
performance of ROA. In 2008, ROA was negative for luxury apparel companies;
referring back to the original data, this became clear because ROA for Burberry in
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2008 was -53%, due to the high costs associated with the implementation of its new
strategic plan (Burberry, 2009). The average ROA for Burberry was -3.75%. This
implies the company was not selling their merchandise at a profitable rate to cover the
costs associated with its assets. Ann Inc.’s ROA in 2008 was low as well, at -34%,
which contributed to the low ROA for mass apparel companies during this year. This
low ROA was also due to the high costs incurred from its new strategic plan in 2008.
ROA for luxury apparel companies was lower in 2008 and 2009, but then increased
slightly above mass apparel companies in 2010 and remained above in 2011. The
averages for ROA for the companies were similar, at 8% for luxury apparel companies
and 8.5% for mass apparel companies.
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Table 5.
Mean Performance of Luxury Apparel and Mass Apparel Companies
Net Sales
Growth

Net
Profit

Asset
Turnover

ROA

-3.43%

Cost of
Gross
Goods Sold Margin
Growth
-1.43%
58.86%

8.00%

0.94

-1.43%

1.13%

3.50%

42.50%

2.50%

1.80

2.25%

1.88%

-0.13%

60.00%

8.63%

0.92

6.88%

-2.50%

-7.38%

45.13%

6.25%

1.61

8.88%

21.88%

10.13%

63.25%

13.38%

0.90

11.88%

10.75%

9.38%

46.25%

7.88%

1.51

11.63%

16.38%

9.50%

65.13%

13.75%

0.91

13.38%

12.00%

15.38%

44.38%

6.75%

1.68

11.13%

2008- Luxury

8.63%

4.63%

61.88%

11.13%

0.92

8.00%

2011 Mass

5.38%

5.25%

44.50%

6.00%

1.65

8.50%

2008 Luxury
Mass
2009 Luxury
Mass
2010 Luxury
Mass
2011 Luxury
Mass
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Figure 2. Net Sales Growth from 2008 to 2011
Net Sales Growth
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Figure 3. Cost of Goods Sold Growth from 2008 to 2011
Cost of Goods Sold Growth
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Figure 4. Gross Margin from 2008 to 2011
Gross Margin
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Figure 5. Net Profit from 2008 to 2011
Net Profit
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%

Luxury Apparel

6%

Mass Apparel

4%
2%
0%
2008

	
  

2009

2010

2011

39	
  

Figure 6. Asset Turnover from 2008 to 2011
Asset Turnover
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Figure 7. ROA from 2008 to 2011
ROA
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It should be noted that Table 5 only showed the mean value of financial
performances of companies. Whether or not the financial performances between
luxury apparel and mass apparel companies was statistically different needed to be
determined based on the results of MANOVA.

4.2 Results of MANOVA
MANOVA was conducted first to determine whether significant difference
existed overall in financial performance during each year and the average of the years
for the companies. Results of the MANOVA main effect test are shown in Table 6.

Table 6.
MANOVA Test Results
Wilks’
Lambda

Pillai’s
Trace

Roy’s
Greatest
Root
3.237

F-Value

P-Value

0.764

HotellingLawley
Trace
3.237

2008

0.236

4.32

0.031**

2009

0.201

0.799

3.979

3.979

5.97

0.009**

2010

0.076

0.924

12.147

12.147

18.22

0.000**

2011

0.197

0.803

4.072

4.072

6.11

0.008**

0.817

4.45

4.45

6.67

0.006**

20080.183
2011
*: P<0.05; **: P<0.01

From 2008 to 2011 both annually and on average, results of Wilks’ Lambda,
Pillai’s Trace, Hotelling-Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root were statistically
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significant at 95 percent confidence level (p<0.05). The results suggest that from
2008 to 2011, overall financial performance between luxury apparel and mass apparel
companies was statistically different.
Between-subject test was further conducted to test whether each index
performed differently between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies within
each year. Results of the MANOVA between-subject test are shown in Table 7.

Table 7.
Between-Subject Test results F-value (P-value)
Net Sales
Growth
0.60

Cost of
Gross
Goods Sold Margin
Growth
0.87
15.67

(0.45)

(0.37)

(0.002)** (0.19)

(0.017)*

(0.73)

0.57

0.98

13.82

6.27

0.73

(0.46)

(0.34)

(0.002)** (0.26)

(0.025)*

(0.41)

1.16

0.01

19.76

9.51

0.01

(0.30)

(0.93)

(0.001)** (0.006)** (0.008)** (0.93)

0.48

1.00

22.82

(0.50)

(0.33)

(0.000)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.47)

2008-

0.44

0.02

19.96

2011

(0.52)

(0.89)

(0.001)** (0.023)*

2008

2009

2010

2011

ROA

1.96

7.57

0.13

1.35

10.54

13.00

6.54

*: P<0.05; **: P<0.01
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12.91

11.33

0.55

0.02

(0.005)** (0.88)

First, a difference in net sales growth was not supported by the test in any year.
The p-value for the t-statistics was larger than 0.05 at the 95% confidence level from
2008 to 2011 both annually and on average.
Second, growth of cost of goods sold was not statistically significant for any of
the years analyzed (p>0.05). This means there was no statistically significant
difference in growth of cost of goods sold between luxury apparel and mass apparel
companies from 2008 to 2011 and the average of the years.
Third, gross margin was statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
level for all the years (p<0.05). This means that gross margin was significantly
different between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011, as
well as the average of the four years.
Fourth, a difference in asset turnover was also supported by the test (p<0.05).
This means that asset turnover was statistically significantly different between luxury
apparel and mass apparel companies for all four years and the average of the years.
Fifth, net profit was not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
level in 2008 and 2009; however, it was statistically significant in 2010, 2011, and in
the average of the years. This means that net profit was not significantly different
between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies for 2008 and 2009, but it was
significantly different for 2010, 2011, and the average.
Sixth, a difference in ROA was not supported by the test (p>0.05). This means
that ROA was not statistically significantly different for luxury apparel and mass
apparel companies for 2008-2011 and on average.
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The study results showed that there was an overall financial difference between
luxury apparel and mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011, including the average
of the four years.

4.3 Discussion
Results of the MANOVA test can be explained through the following aspects.
First, the results showed the differentiated performance between luxury apparel
and mass apparel companies as reflected by the statistical difference in gross margin
and asset turnover. Gross margin was higher each year for luxury apparel companies
than mass apparel companies. For example, the average gross margin for luxury
companies from 2008 to 2011 was 61.88%, whereas it was 44.5% for mass apparel
companies. Luxury apparel companies are known to have higher markup than mass
apparel companies, and since gross margin is the money that is kept from sales after
accounting for costs, companies with higher markups and higher retail prices earn high
gross margins (Kapferer & Tabatoni, 2010; Sable, n.d.). Asset turnover was higher for
mass apparel companies each year and the average of the years. They have higher
asset turnover because of their competitive pricing with lower price tags than luxury
apparel. This leads assets to turn over more quickly as merchandise turns over more
quickly, thus creating a higher asset turnover. At the company level, there were
differences in asset turnover among the companies as variation may exist in terms of
prices and assortment mix. For mass apparel companies, average asset turnover
ranged from 1.15 (Ralph Lauren) to 2.25 (Chico’s). For luxury apparel companies,
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average asset turnover had a greater variation, from 0.36 (Christian Dior) to 1.65
(Mulberry). Overall average asset turnover for mass apparel companies was 1.65
whereas it was 0.92 for luxury apparel companies. Based on the results, it appeared
that luxury apparel companies have a higher gross margin and lower asset turnover,
whereas mass apparel companies have a lower gross margin and higher asset turnover.
Second, the results showed that luxury apparel companies achieved a more
robust post-crisis recovery than mass apparel companies. Net sales for luxury apparel
companies increased significantly in 2010, 21.88%, whereas mass apparel net sales
increased 10.75%. Net profit was significantly higher for luxury apparel companies in
2011, at 13.75%, whereas net profit for mass apparel companies was 6.75%. Luxury
apparel customers were becoming confident again about making luxury purchases. A
major contributing factor to the growth of the global luxury industry was the rising
demand from developing markets, particularly China (S&P Dow Jones, 2012; Barrie,
2009).
Third, there was no evidence showing that the luxury apparel market was more
lucrative in terms of return on investments, (ROA). For example, the overall average
ROA from 2008 to 2011 was 8% and 8.5% for luxury apparel and mass apparel
companies respectively. Although the overall averages were similar, variation existed
among averages at the company level. For luxury apparel companies, the average
ROA ranged from -3.75% (Burberry) to 14.75% (Mulberry); for mass apparel
companies, the average ROA ranged from -4.25% (Ann Inc.) to 16.25% (Guess?).
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This suggested that neither luxury apparel nor mass apparel companies outperformed
each other based on ROA.
It should be noted that Ralph Lauren, a mass apparel company in this study,
operates its lines under a number of price tiers. Although its premium brands are
considered in the luxury apparel segment, it does a large amount of business in the
mass apparel segment as well (Ralph Lauren, 2012).
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Findings
This study intended to evaluate whether the different business models of
luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies resulted in the luxury apparel
companies performing better from 2008 to 2011. Under the framework of the Dupont
Strategic Profit Model, financial performance of eight luxury apparel companies and
eight mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011 were compared against six indices
by using the MANOVA technique. The results showed that:
First, the overall financial performance between luxury apparel and mass
apparel companies was statistically different from 2008 to 2011.
Second, luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies had different
gross margin and asset turnover from 2008 to 2011.
Third, there was no evidence showing that the luxury apparel companies and
mass apparel companies achieved different growth of net sales, growth of cost of
goods sold and return on assets (ROA) from 2008 to 2011.
Fourth, luxury apparel companies outperformed the mass apparel companies
starting in 2010 in terms of net profit margin, indicating a more robust post-crisis
recovery.
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5.2 Implications of the Findings
Findings of this study have several important implications.
First, the results show that the apparel market has been recovering since 2010
from the financial crisis. Particularly, the robust performance of the luxury apparel
companies both in the volume of net sales and in profitability after 2010 implies that
the luxury customers could have become more confident in spending and/or the luxury
market is growing globally (S&P Dow Jones, 2012).
Second, despite the positive development of the luxury apparel market, results
of the study suggest that apparel companies should not rush into the luxury market.
Particularly, ROA of the luxury apparel companies turned out to be no better than the
mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011, even in those years that the luxury
apparel companies achieved higher net profit margin. This is largely because the asset
turnover ratios of the luxury apparel companies were much lower as a result of much
higher investment in total assets (such as inventory and fiscal property). On the
contrary, to keep growing its business, the luxury apparel companies might consider
purposefully expanding into the mass apparel market so as to reach more consumer
bases and improve the performance in asset turnover. Some companies have already
taken action. For example, Missoni, a privately-held luxury apparel company,
collaborated with Target, a discount department store, for a collection that was
available for only a limited time (Felice, 2011). The collection was created under the
Missoni name and featured menswear and womenswear with average price points
from $30 to $60.
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Third, findings of the study suggest diversified business models within the
group of luxury apparel companies. For example, the financial performance of
LVMH, Hermès and Prada appeared to be very different from Burberry in terms of net
profit margin, asset turnover and return on assets. It is unclear yet whether the
differences were due to their specific market focus or product specialization, which
can be further studied.

5.3 Limitations and Future Research Agendas
Despite the meaningful and interesting results, this study also has several
limitations that might be overcome in future studies.
First, due to the availability of data, only publicly traded apparel companies
were included in the study, although several well-known luxury companies such as
Chanel, Versace, and Giorgio Armani are privately held. Reliability of the study
could be improved if more companies could be included in the analysis. Additionally,
PPR and LVMH reported their financial data for the companies as a whole and not
their fashion and luxury divisions which could affect the results.
Second, country or market-specific data was not available. Complete financial
data for each company per country or specific market is not reported. This is a
limitation because studies suggest that a majority of business for luxury apparel
companies is coming from the growing wealth of emerging markets whereas the
majority of business for mass apparel companies is coming from the U.S. Some
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luxury apparel companies may have more global presence than others. This could
affect the result by not being an even comparison.
Third, the diversity of luxury apparel companies may affect the MANOVA
results which are sensitive to within-group differences. For example, Mulberry
appeared to be much different than the other luxury companies, particularly in terms
of sales growth, cost of goods sold growth, and asset turnover.
From this study, future studies can be conducted to analyze and compare the
financial performances of apparel companies. As statistical financial performance did
exist between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011, future
studies can research whether a statistically significantly difference continues. Case
studies can be performed on individual companies to analyze their financial
performance. These case studies could study a particular company over a specific
period of time to analyze its business model, strategic growth, and financial
performance. Other studies could focus on apparel companies within individual
countries or regions to determine their performance per region. This could provide
information as to what types of apparel companies perform best in what region, for
example, whether luxury apparel companies would succeed in a particular region or
whether the consumers in that region would respond better to mass apparel companies.
Additionally, a study could compare and contrast luxury apparel companies to other
retail formats, including department stores or discount stores to determine whether
there was difference in financial performance from 2008 to 2011 between other retail
formats.
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